Episode 3: Gazan-American & Jewish-Israeli Examine Hamas Polls and Building a New Future for the Region

In this third powerful conversation in our special video series, Z3 host Rabbi Amitai Fraiman sits down with Gazan-American advocate Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib to tackle the intricate layers of identity, misinformation, and hope in the Israel-Gaza conflict. They begin with Ahmed’s insights into life under Hamas rule in Gaza, sharing the day-to-day struggles of Palestinians caught in the crossfire. The conversation explores the often-overlooked influence of propaganda and misinformation—particularly around polling data and public opinion—while underscoring the impact these narratives have on both Palestinian lives and international perspectives. Ahmed’s call for international support that empowers Palestinians to achieve self-governance and economic stability offers a fresh perspective on moving beyond rhetoric to meaningful action for peace. This episode dives deep into the intersections of Palestinian identity, regional politics, and the future of the region.

Through this honest exchange, Ahmed and Amitai illuminate the struggles and hopes shared across their communities, emphasizing the potential of Jewish-Palestinian dialogue in transforming narratives and fostering mutual understanding. Join us for a powerful episode that cuts through rhetoric, seeking pathways for empathy, accountability, and, ultimately, peace.

We are deeply grateful to Ahmed for joining us in this difficult but crucial conversation in these times of deep division and strife.

This conversation was recorded on August 30, 2024.

Watch now | Listen Now


About our guest:

Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib is an American writer and analyst who grew up in Gaza City, having left in 2005 as a teenage exchange student to the United States. He writes extensively on Gaza’s political and humanitarian affairs and has been an outspoken critic of Hamas and a promoter of coexistence and peace as the only path forward between Palestinians and Israelis. Alkhatib is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs. He has a bachelor’s degree in business administration and a master’s in intelligence and national security studies. His writing has been published in US, and Israeli outlets and his opinions and comments have been featured in the international press.


Episode Transcript

00:00:00:00 - 00:00:11:02

Welcome, Ahmed. There's our third conversation. And really, I’ve really grown from the beginning. I was excited about this conversation, but I'm, like, happy.

00:00:11:04 - 00:00:29:15

You can tell I'm smiling. It's good to be in your presence. It's good to have these conversations. Third one in this spot, turned out to be a series. And yeah, welcome back to the podcast. It's great to have you. Thank you, thank you. Delighted to be here. And sad that for the time being, this may be our last for just a few months until we figure it out.

00:00:29:17 - 00:00:41:16

Moving to D.C. is, you know, in the next couple of weeks. Yeah. That's exciting. I want to hear, I want you to be able to share that also with our audiences because that's a big, that's a big deal. I know you were some questions that we didn't discuss on camera, but, you know, we were debating a conversation.

00:00:41:17 - 00:00:56:25

Talk about this. And, I'm delighted that, you know, it's, the plans are forming up in the air. We have several producing here in the Bay area, but for good reason. So thanks for having me. Yeah. So, alright, so, I mean, the first two conversations ended up being a little bit, you know, the first one focused —

00:00:56:25 - 00:01:16:07

We covered a lot in this conversation. That's the truth. But the first one, I felt that — I'm looking back at it and listening back — by design was, we spent a lot of time learning about your background and what brought you to your activism and where you are in your family. And you shared about, you know, the loss that you experienced in the current war

00:01:16:09 - 00:01:35:29

in a very,open and moving way. And of course, your observations of what's going on. And then the second, you talk a bit more about like October 7th and the current war, of course, that's the backdrop of a lot of this, but was more specific talk about public opinion polls. We talk about all kinds of different, and elements that came up and what we saw on the news and people celebrating.

00:01:36:01 - 00:01:54:09

That was a lot, much more like actual, I hope today, you know, who knows? But, I'm hoping that today we cover a little bit more future-forward. I think it's good to finish in an arc, you know, hope and not, you know, a, I describe a conversation as pragmatically hopeful. You know, optimistic.

00:01:54:11 - 00:02:32:23

Absolutely. So, yeah. So I just, you know, I'm glad and I, and I really do want to start, I think my first question, because it's just so top of mind, you know, what's happened? When we're recording this, this is going to come out later, but, it was exposed by, you know, the idea of found, incriminating documentation that the results, of, probably the main public opinion poll it was used in throughout the war about how the streets in Gaza, how everyday Gazans felt about the war on Hamas, those were fabricated, meddled with, influenced, pick your weight.

00:02:32:25 - 00:03:01:23

And you said, you, in that conversation, in the previous one, you told me straight up, look, this research was respected and that's that. But, you know, I know other research. I know people personally. And that's not what, that's some reflection that I don't know of. And for one, I'm for one, I was relieved when that came out and so, you know, I'm just curious, you know, what you’re, how you feel with this evolution of this story, this murder.

00:03:01:25 - 00:03:40:08

Certainly. Well, it's been, for lack of a better word, a moment of vindication, if you will, and that I have long believed that these polls are unrepresentative of the people of Gaza. I actually think both nowadays and even before October 7th, these polls defied the logic of, how could a population be overwhelmingly in favor of an armed group that has held them hostage, that has put them in an awful situation for 17 years, poor quality of life, decimated prospects for a peaceful resolution or political settlement with the Palestinian Authority or Fatah, or with Israel and the broader, region and conflict.

00:03:40:11 - 00:03:58:23

I've repeatedly said that if you are standing in a dirty, disgusting bathroom line with hundreds of people, if your child is sick and you can't find them a Tylenol, if you're hungry, if you've been displaced 17 times, you lost half of your family. You lost your homes. You're not sitting there saying, wow, October 7th did us a favor.

00:03:58:23 - 00:04:25:07

Wow. Hamas is wonderful. Wow. This is going really great. Not just based on the consequences of October 7th, but because you've seen Hamas time and again set the Palestinian people back. I've long questioned the overall, the overreliance, if you will, on polls in an illiberal, undemocratic society that is governed by an Islamist terror organization that is essentially a military dictatorship.

00:04:25:10 - 00:04:51:24

Taking it a step further, Hamas has historically invested heavily in perception, management capabilities and tools, whether it be through bona fide counterintelligence, the science of counterintelligence, which includes misinformation and disinformation and propaganda, or whether it be through WhatsApp and Facebook groups, whether it be through online trolls, through media, manipulation. These polls just did not make sense to me.

00:04:51:24 - 00:05:17:01

And people in Gaza have a tendency of telling pollsters what they want to hear. Plus, if these pollsters were escorted or surrounded by Hamas agents and Hamas collaborators, Hamas informants, this is not to say that Hamas has no ideological support or no base of support, but I've long put it at no more than 30%, one third of the population and even that, 30%.

00:05:17:03 - 00:05:40:27

I feel like there are some of them that support Hamas ideologically. Some of them, it's just the job, they get paid by the Kassam Brigades or by the social aspect, component of Hamas. And so the thing with these, what's been really interesting to observe with these revelations, and I said immediately, I was like, I take anything that the IDF says with a pinch of salt for good reason.

00:05:40:29 - 00:06:02:08

And still I think this confirms a lot, what many have suspected, which is that these polls are not to be trusted, even though they've been considered. And that's not to say the pollsters themselves tell you which cocky, who's a respected pollster and a researcher, and it's really difficult to do polling in the Palestinian territory.

00:06:02:08 - 00:06:33:06

So these really government, the IDF, that, you know, think tanks have long relied on his research. But there were other pollsters that I've talked to who have done smaller sample sizes, and their findings were completely inconsistent with what he had offered. I never talked to some person in Gaza since October 7th who is not vehemently against Hamas, against October 7th, tells me stories of how other people around them are reacting to what's happening.

00:06:33:08 - 00:06:56:13

And so I've been trying desperately to get this message out, because unfortunately, these polls were used to dehumanize the people of Gaza, to say they're all Hamas. They're all terrorists. They all support the killing of the Jews, and therefore we must punish them. We must deradicalise, we must. And I've long felt that nothing has been more harmful to the Palestinian people than these polls.

00:06:56:16 - 00:07:16:11

That's not to say that we shouldn't understand what Palestinians really think. And I'm also specifically talking about Gaza. The West Bank has a different context in that they've never had to live under Hamas, their quality of life as much as the occupation and the settlements and the suffering are tough. It’s substantially light years ahead of what exists in Gaza.

00:07:16:13 - 00:07:44:22

But it's also been interesting to see who's happy about these findings. These revelations by the IDF and who's upset and who's, you know. So before we jump into that, because that part to me is, I mean, across the board, there's this very interesting view. Like if you isolate like, why this group is happy, why this group is unhappy, etc., but I just want to, I want to go back to something you said, you know, in the first piece here about, you know, feeling vindicated and the difference between what you know to be true with our own.

00:07:44:28 - 00:08:00:17

And it's not just — to be clear. It's not a matter of anecdotal stories. It's speaking to, I mean, many people having lived there and having family there and listening to other pollsters. Right? So it's not just, oh, I spoke to ten of my best friends and they've told me what I eat.

00:08:00:17 - 00:08:19:06

You know what I kind of know? It's a much broader thing. So there's that piece, which is I find, you know, important to undermine them and then the other piece that I think is really interesting, is, you know, is recognizing that there still is an issue, you know, but I do think that there's a, you know, even if 30%.

00:08:19:06 - 00:08:46:10

Right. And let's say it's, as you said, we don't ideologically necessarily believe, but are either paid by or whatever, right? There is still an element that exists. And that's not to say that and therefore, we should now to the rest. But it's also to say, you know what? Every society has its radicals. Okay. To say that any Western sort of, you know, certainly Western civilizations and societies and countries and cultures, but around the world, you're always, you have an element that's extreme.

00:08:46:10 - 00:09:01:14

And so you have to treat it as such. Right. Instead of saying that projected on the rest of them, I mean, I think, you know, and this on a personal note, and this is to the next point, which is, you know, who responded, I was so relieved to see that, not because, you know, we had the conversation.

00:09:01:14 - 00:09:22:18

I left it feeling very hopeful, but just because I know, you know, at that moment knew that not everybody felt that way, but that beyond that, like I had no information to back it up. That was great. But now that there's a public, like a real public exclamation, that, by the way, is worth noting that Israel could have buried precisely right.

00:09:22:18 - 00:09:40:23

Like Israel could have said the war was based on this. A lot of. Yeah, a huge right. Like they could have said, you know what, you know, and there's a cynical interpretation here as well, which I'm happy to kind of like unpack in a second. But yeah, Peter Lerner, right. And former spokesperson, I went out and said like a whole thing of like, guys, we got this wrong, right?

00:09:40:23 - 00:10:00:22

And I know that. And, you know, he's out of the conversation as well around this all, this is it. It's so interesting to see who's latching onto this as a beacon of hope and like a reason to  reconsider, change, pivot, to re engage,and who's not. I'm curious. Now you're saying if we're right, that I'm happy that, you know, I'll see.

00:10:00:24 - 00:10:17:23

Well, I've been seeing some of that comment. I mean, yes, to your point. I mean, again, a lot of the war strategy, a lot of the thinking, a lot of the justification, the ethos of the war has been around. They all support guys, Hamas, and they all support October 7th. And we've seen these polls time and again, you know, proving it.

00:10:17:23 - 00:10:40:27

So therefore we need a de-radicalisation. We need to show them who's boss, second, like so I agree. That's why what I said, I wonder what's in Israel's interest to reveal those documents if they were in fact fake, if anything, it’s like you said, it would have been just easier to keep quiet. And I'm sure they found documents that they're not sharing with the outside world related to the war effort, etc..

00:10:40:29 - 00:11:06:11

So it's been interesting to see several folks on the Jewish pro-Israel side, like you said, latch on to it. It's a great word to say. You've been saying this, Ahmed, for ten months, and I kind of believed you. I didn't believe you. But now I see there's a there there, or this gives me hope. This tells me that like, yeah, there are a lot of, and it's, in a way it's vindicating.

00:11:06:11 - 00:11:31:21

But in a way it's also silly in that, like, of course we should have known that most people in Gaza, in one way or another, do not support Hamas beyond the ideological base of support. Be like, it's silly to think that everybody in Gaza, 2.3 million are all behind Hamas. But you know what's interesting about that? Because I like it's yes, 100% when you have it, when you're able to sit down and have a conversation with somebody, then you can follow logic then, of course.

00:11:31:21 - 00:11:46:23

Right. Well, people are in an emotional state. They need to believe anything. And I know it's true in the other way. In other words, there are people will say, you know, all Israelis are IDF soldiers and therefore they're all doing this and they all believe that. And it's like, of course they come from other camp. Precisely. Be that right.

00:11:46:23 - 00:12:05:25

Precisely. It's just easier and more comfortable and reassuring and especially wounds of trauma to want to believe anything, but I, you know that the point is like the quick reversal in that is where I find the book precisely that. And on the other side, to see the people are saying this is IDF propaganda. This is not real.

00:12:05:28 - 00:12:29:24

Some of them are saying, okay, it's IDF propaganda. It's, some of it are taking it a step further and saying, no, people in Gaza love Hamas. They support the armed resistance group. They're like, they're militantly like trying to prove the point of the polls because they themselves have basically been duped into thinking that Hamas is an organic expression of resistance, and Hamas is Palestine and Hamas is Gaza.

00:12:30:00 - 00:13:08:06

And instead of separating the people of Gaza from Hamas, they've doubled down on Hamas. Is Gaza, in a way, in agreement with the pro-Israel people that they're so against? And so that has both been interesting, revealing, and quite disturbing, to be honest, because I've said this time and again and again in all my writings, all my posts and all my podcast, at a time when people in Gaza in masks are turning against Hamas because they're experiencing the consequences of Hamas's actions, at a time when people in Gaza are done and they want this to be their last war, they want this to be the end of Hamas's ability to hold them hostage to its nefarious

00:13:08:06 - 00:13:34:29

and useless program. You have droves of people outside of Gaza and certainly including in the Western world. And I'm not saying every person who's pro-Palestine is that. Absolutely not. But you have the mainstreaming of pro-Hamas sentiments within the pro-Palestine solidarity group in a way that it groups, in a way that I think is harmful to the, just in terms of Palestinian aspirations for freedom and self-determination and liberation.

00:13:35:06 - 00:14:19:03

And so it's been disturbing to, instead of like, for all of the my disagreements with the pro-Israel side and for all of the attacks, that I get attacked all the time by the pro-Israel side, because I'm very critical of these regular government and of the IDF and of the settlements and the military occupation. But I have witnessed a far more interest in looking at this from a hopeful, let's move forward angle by someone, the pro-Israel side, then the other way around with the pro-Palestine folks for whom this is either, like I said, at best, just IDF propaganda, as they're used to anything the IDF says is is propaganda to them, or at worst,

00:14:19:03 - 00:14:56:02

it's like it kind of destroys a lot of their own belief system around resistance and Hamas and the Palestinian cause. And it's more comfortable to just like stay where you're at than to reassess, which I think is, that is a true shame. Yeah, it is a true shame. It's heartbreaking because I think that part of what I struggle with in this whole thing, you know, and, you know, early on in the war, you know, there was an attempt to make a distinction between, like the try to be a boxer, you're either pro-war or anti-war and from like from a marketing perspective, it's very

00:14:56:02 - 00:15:19:21

it's like pro-life. And, you know, what are you pro-choice or pro-life? And, so, but focusing on that paradigm, you know, if I felt like as someone who, admittedly, you know, that's about right. I was in the IDF and I was a pain commander in Gaza in the first in ‘09 and in Operation Cast Lead.

00:15:19:24 - 00:15:39:09

You know, I, and from a real politic perspective, I can understand when it's necessary to use force. Now, does that mean that it should be unbridled and uncontrolled? Of course not. Does that mean as we just got from it? Right. And I can say from my personal experience, it's never that right. It's never intention.

00:15:39:13 - 00:16:01:10

I have never been in a situation that was intentionally indiscriminate. I've been in situations where it was misidentification or there were civilians in the vicinity. There were unknowns, there trenches, heartbreaking tragedies. But that's not to say that like, I was ever in a position like, we gotta go to war. This is like, this is a romanticization of, like, violence, right?

00:16:01:12 - 00:16:23:20

This is what it needs to be. This is the desired approach. But I will say that certainly from a perspective of like, well, if all of Gazans here, the poll supported this and I see celebration and deep trauma and pain, you know, then that, you know, whatever, you know, not all means necessary.

00:16:23:20 - 00:16:46:11

What is necessary. You've got to do this. It's unfortunate. Right. And then to see something like this, I was like, oh my God, thank goodness. Like, you don't actually have to do this, right. Like the minute we have like slimmest of reasons to trying to like really back in and pivot I think is, was for me, it's like I texted immediately the first person, I texted my son, this was like, I can't believe it.

00:16:46:11 - 00:17:12:11

Did you see like, are you seeing this? Yes, sir. But you already did. Of course. But, so the point, the broader point, I'm trying to make, though, I think, is that, you know, in terms of refueling, of who I think it's who's directly affected by this, ultimately, who see this as some kind of like, intellectual or romantic kind of philosophical debate between perceived good and bad and I think those are people were disappointed by these findings.

00:17:12:15 - 00:17:45:29

Precisely. And I have skin in the game to want to believe that these findings are real aid, because my understanding of how Hamas operates proves that they manipulate, like, directly and indirectly, overtly and covertly, through a whole host of mechanisms and means. I mean, that's what makes Islamist groups stunningly effective. I mean, look who won the elections after Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in 2011 and Egypt within a year, the Muslim Brotherhood took over because they are masters of public opinion and manipulation and using data and using like real precise messaging.

00:17:46:02 - 00:18:11:06

So for me, and it ties neatly into the theme that I, we had wanted to kind of describe in our third conversation, is the moving forward piece. Because to me, this also mainly, especially on the pro-Israel side, who those who say we basically have to have reeducation camp for the people of Gaza or deradicalisation programs that are so like akin to what we did to the Nazis and whatever.

00:18:11:11 - 00:18:36:04

Like, I have long believed that these were overstated, that yes, there needs to be a shift in on the Palestinian side, but part of that is the result of lived experience. Like 70% of Gazans have never left Gaza like, and it's amazing that it's not even 100% who support Hamas. But again, it's a combination of isolation, you can say for some brainwashing and indoctrination, but also for others,

00:18:36:04 - 00:18:55:00

it's like, no, they've lived the consequences of Hamas. They have smartphones, they have TVs. They know that there's an alternative outside just, you know, on the other side in Israel and/or in Egypt. And they see how the rest of the Arab world has sort of moved on from the Palestine issue. And they want real solutions to their crises.

00:18:55:02 - 00:19:12:16

They want to, you know, at the end of the day, to them, we have entire generations of Palestinians that, since Hamas took over, that only know eight hours of electricity a day or eight hours of electricity at a time, or water on for like, they tell you when the water is coming on, not one, it's not coming, going, it's going off.

00:19:12:16 - 00:19:37:09

So at the end of the day, to them, that's like their most immediate needs, beyond which they want to see Gaza be a prosperous place. And that's what I'm hoping to push for. And that's part of the move to D.C. That's part of why I'm working on multiple tracks, both in terms of the narrative, in terms of the humanity and the empathy and connecting with Israelis and the healing and reconciliation and pushing for peace and coexistence.

00:19:37:17 - 00:19:59:20

The pragmatic ideas that humanitarian solutions is like multiple tracks to move us beyond this moment, even though, yes, it's unclear if there's going to be a ceasefire anytime soon, it's unclear what you know. It seems to be clear that there's going to be some kind of an ongoing military occupation for the near, for the foreseeable future, unless that's replaced by something else.

00:19:59:27 - 00:20:27:21

But that doesn't preclude us from envisioning an actual alternative and an actual Gaza to where I would actually say that all of that just, it's incumbent on us to continue to imagine that alternative future, because we can't just settle for what it is and it's continuously hopeful that it can be better. And I'm, you know, I want to hear, I'm curious to hear more about, some, you know, ask you to come up with, like, a ten point plan, like how we're going to rebuild, you know, revolutionize the conversation and discourse.

00:20:27:21 - 00:20:46:26

But I do think that people are curious to hear, you know, some tangible elements or some kind of ideas and movements and not just, you know, not to put everything on your shoulders after, but come on, get to work, you know? But I know, but, I'm doing, I'm uprooting my life and going to D.C.

00:20:46:28 - 00:21:08:21

Yeah. But I think that people are genuinely curious and and like, okay, so. All right. So the polls are wrong. Thank goodness. They don't want Hamas in their lives. How do we now get rid of Hamas? Right. How do we create an alternative. And so it's a multi-tiered strategy.

00:21:08:21 - 00:21:31:17

First and foremost, this war needs to end as soon as possible. We need to get the hostages out. We need to surge humanitarian aid, and we need to bring law and order back in there. But there's going to need to be a transitional period and a provisional government, a provisional authority that helps Gaza. It does. And it gradually takes over the security responsibility.

00:21:31:17 - 00:21:58:17

And that's why I've long been an advocate for a limited peacekeeping-slash-policing force, largely made up of Arab nations and others, to police Gaza's borders with Israel to ensure that there is no infiltration, there's no future October 7th-type of attack anytime soon, and to coordinate with the Israeli authorities to act as a barrier, basically between the Palestinians and Israelis, create an early warning system.

00:21:58:17 - 00:22:26:22

If you to control the Philadelphia corridor, make sure there's no more smuggling, no more tunnels that go back to being operational and then, most importantly, to secure the humanitarian aid convoys. Right now, we have a serious lawlessness problem. Armed thugs and gangs, some of whom are part of clan, some of whom are part of former splinter cells, if you will, of Hamas and others who basically, it's every man for himself.

00:22:26:22 - 00:23:01:25

They form a small old gang and they rob a lot of the aid. They rob a lot of people, they act as total thugs. And they're right by the Kerem Shalom crossing on the Gaza side. And they just wait for the incoming and outgoing trucks to loot them. So we need this, most urgent aspect of it is ending the war, surging aid in, restoring some kind of limited law and order that can protect the aid, and then finally separating the Israelis and Palestinians to allow for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza.

00:23:01:25 - 00:23:32:02

Because if Israeli troops stay in Gaza, that will give birth to Hamas 2.0. That makes Hamas continue to be relevant as a resistance group that generates immense resentment. Now, that doesn't mean that Israel isn't going to be involved. I understand that just from a pragmatic point of view, like if I were Israel, like, I certainly would want to in the short term address the risk of Hamas coming back to power, address the risk of preventing another, the re-armament, another October 7th-type attack.

00:23:32:02 - 00:24:00:10

And I don't believe there's going to be a tangible, immediate risk in the near future of something like an October 7th at worst. We're talking about limited scale. One rocket here, one rocket there that most likely will either fall in an empty area or there fall and they'll be intercepted by the Iron Dome. The type of rocket volleys that we saw in the past are, I think, have been reduced to a trickle, if not outright eliminated.

00:24:00:13 - 00:24:27:12

We need to deal with the unexploded munitions. I wrote a piece for a think tank two years ago or three years ago now, about how Hamas and other militants use a lot of the unexploded munitions from the shells and the missiles that don't explode upon impact to actually extract explosive materials. And they use readily available items and raw materials from the destroyed buildings to manufacture rockets, just using even plumbing pipes in those.

00:24:27:16 - 00:24:49:07

So those immediate things that like get down to brass tacks. And this is what frustrates me about a lot of folks who, you know, obviously and rightfully, in my opinion, call for the end of the war, is very little public conversations about the immediate steps. People just want the war to end. But I don't want a freezing of the conflict.

00:24:49:07 - 00:25:06:23

I want the war's end to be the beginning of political transformation. So that's one of the immediate steps that I'm thinking. So I want to hear more. I do have a couple of, just a question there because, you know, it sounds reasonable, of course. Right. And even to an extent, manageable. I'm not, you know, I'm thankfully not in that position 

00:25:06:25 - 00:25:32:01

and to, you know, to make it happen. But I, from, like, from Israeli perspective. Right. And what do you do with the border with Egypt, with Philadelphia. Right. Because I think the biggest issue there is that there's a misalignment, almost, of priorities. Right. And like, why, who and why is letting in or letting in so many smuggling goods to go into Gaza?

00:25:32:03 - 00:25:53:26

Who's going to actually make sure that that ends, right. Because we can't, can Egypt be brought in as a mature and responsible actor and to hold that space accountable, because in theory they should be supported with them. Yeah, certainly. Lots to say there. First of all, there's actually an easy element to this

00:25:53:29 - 00:26:20:27

and this connects directly to why I'm not in Gaza and I couldn't go back to Gaza, which is that between 2005 and 2006, there was an agreement with the European Union to have a Euro police mission that operated the Rafah border crossing, that actually there was some Palestinian guards on one side, but the border crossing was essentially operated on the Palestinian side by a European police mission, and it ran smoothly.

00:26:20:27 - 00:26:53:04

It was a super professional operation, quick in and out, like some of the best operation of the Rafah border crossing was when the European police mission ran it on the Palestinian side. And so that, there's a discussion of bringing that back and I actually, it's funny, I talked to so many Palestinians who would prefer non-Hamas and non-Fatah people running it, and this could be a transitional solution for 3 to 5 years until the Palestinian Authority or a rejuvenated Palestinian administrative body can take over.

00:26:53:05 - 00:27:14:02

The goal is ultimately for Palestinian sovereignty. But in the short term, we have a precedent of how to operate the passenger crossing as far as the smuggling of, I mean, you have to remember that, like, we're now, what we're seeing in terms of the number of times, the size of tunnels and the consequences of the tunnels, of all the things that were smuggled.

00:27:14:04 - 00:27:38:20

This is like the end of like a 20 year window in which smuggling went through golden arrows, and it was on the rise. And then it was on the decline, and then it remained down to the trickle. But Egypt largely stopped most of the smuggling to got in and out of Gaza. Egypt does not know where a lot of these tunnels, Egypt displace the entirety of Egyptian Rafah years ago due to an insurgency.

00:27:38:20 - 00:28:02:05

But they were worried about Hamas cooperating with ISIS in Sinai. And so Egypt has every interest in not allowing the re-smuggling to take place. And so I think it's important. And also a lot of these times the IDF is saying, the dozens these have been around for a long time. These are not new tunnels. And these are not known to the Egyptian authorities.

00:28:02:12 - 00:28:27:13

And some of them are dormant. Some of them are no longer operational, if you will, in the sense that, like everything going into Sinai, northern Sinai and the Egyptian side of the border, is subject to immense scrutiny by the Egyptian military and intelligence. So I'm saying this as like a positive thing. I think people are overblowing, believe it or not, the risk of smuggling once the war stops.

00:28:27:13 - 00:28:48:19

And given that a lot of the towns have been destroyed. So you think that like, because I mean, Israel has found, has destroyed and has also suffered, of course, all these volumes of rockets and whatnot. It's an incredible amount of ammunition. So that's a factor of just years of aggregation. Precisely, precisely that. And nothing happening during the war and nothing happened there.

00:28:48:22 - 00:29:10:26

Right. Okay. So you're saying if, we're, perspective, if there is a, if, you know, ending the war and cleaning up that area, Egypt is on board and we can really gonna conclude that 1,000% and finally yes bring in, I mean, I call for bringing in a non-Israeli and a non-Egyptian on the Palestinian side and a party that's agreed upon by all.

00:29:10:28 - 00:29:42:21

And it could include Jordanians, it could include the Emiratis and the Saudis and bringing in the Saudis, I think, to monitor the area to ensure and the United States could help with technologies to detect tunnels, like from a security and a technical and a political point of view. I think it's entirely solvable. This Philadelphia corridor. And plus, again, Israel is going to have tight eyes on in terms of intelligence, ISR to monitor what's coming in, what's going out.

00:29:42:23 - 00:30:08:11

I don't think smuggling into Gaza is going to be what it used to be any time soon, probably never again. We're talking about the, some of two decades worth of smuggling. And remember that between 2011 and 2013, we have a situation where the borders were practically wide open and smuggling. And I went to the Gaza borders in 2012.

00:30:08:14 - 00:30:29:08

I was there in April of 2012 on the Egyptian side, I didn't make it into Gaza. I was, my brother was with me, and I took him there just to see the borders myself. And it was out in your face in the open. The trucks were coming in, I saw livestock, I saw rebar, I saw cement trucks, I saw trailers with cars.

00:30:29:08 - 00:31:00:15

And they were putting them into tunnels. Hamas for from 2011 to 2013 made millions of dollars taxing. That's how they financed their government, taxing these tunnels. And then when Sisi came to power and Hamas aligned itself with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian government and the military intelligence all went after all of those smuggling routes. And even then, and by the way, a lot of the munitions in Gaza came in from Libya after the fall of Gaddafi's regime.

00:31:00:17 - 00:31:33:19

Vast stockpiles made their way across Egypt, but also there were smuggling routes, that Iran was sending some weapons through Sudan. And that was part of that normalization treaty with Sudan in 2020 with the Abraham Accords, was an attempt to basically get Sudan in part to clamp down on the smuggling. So again, we're talking about things that the infrastructure, that enable the accumulation of firepower and technology and know-how, are no longer in place.

00:31:33:22 - 00:32:02:12

And it is also true that Hamas manufactured a lot of things domestically with the know-how and from Hezbollah and from the Houthis and from Iran. So I genuinely think from a security point of view, during this transitional period, we can easily put in mechanisms and structures in place that are dynamic, that ensure no more smuggling, no more bringing in of illicit, and that everything is above ground for everyone to see it.

00:32:02:14 - 00:32:19:25

But I think that, so that's, I mean, that's super helpful and I appreciate and I think that, you know, that's almost like a prerequisite, right. We got to take care of that. Right? So let's say we did. We take care of that. That's good. As I said, we're all happy with that piece.

00:32:19:27 - 00:32:48:13

How do you like, what can we do, or can be done, to kind of try and diminish the ability for us to go back to power and, that's, question and this is, again, this is like only from like, it is really perspective, right? Certainly not someone who's lived there who's gone to where it's, I don't know, you know, and I want to be and, you know, educate to an extent.

00:32:48:15 - 00:33:13:04

But the perception is similar to the polls that we discussed in the beginning of this episode is that, you know, governance is not the strong suit of those who have been managing or speaking on behalf of the Palestinian people in front of people to hear, anybody. And the question is, how do you, it's like I would say it's a deeper shift.

00:33:13:04 - 00:33:35:06

It's like another order of, you know, reorganizing. It's fine. Okay. Law and order. Okay. And security. Okay. But I was like, wait, you know, assuming that the end game is a democratic country, right. And so there's like changes that need to happen as well, I think in terms of how, you know, what's expected, I guess, of

00:33:35:09 - 00:33:49:01

what happens next. And so I'm curious to hear your thoughts on, like, how do we do that? Because, I mean, clearly, I feel like, you know, you and I are here right now. And part of, okay, like, we're steeped in this stuff. You know, you spent your majority youth or large part of your life already, right?

00:33:49:03 - 00:34:07:00

And that has informed your worldview for sure. And not just for myself as well. But that's, as you said, 70% of never left Gaza. So how do we kind of imbue the discourse with that? How do we kind of encourage that? Well, I do feel confident that beyond, you know, when people are like, where are the Palestinian leaders?

00:34:07:00 - 00:34:42:14

Where are the visionaries? Like there's an incredible amount of talent that already is there that, I mean, the Palestinians are the most educated among the Arab world, the lowest illiteracy. And so I'm confident that the Palestinian people, if given a chance, particularly mid-level and lower level bureaucrats, talents, academics, and deal workers, statisticians like scientists, doctors would absolutely play a pivotal role in the, in Gaza 2.0 in the governance game, if you will.

00:34:42:17 - 00:35:10:21

And so to me, it's not an issue of the Palestinians necessarily need to be taught how to govern per se. They need help with the resources. They need help with the guidance, they most need help with leadership. Then a leadership that is invested in seeing Gaza become the beating heart of a future Palestinian state, and seeing a leadership that does not want to use Gaza as a citadel for launching new attacks on Israel.

00:35:10:24 - 00:35:33:12

I think that once that is set in motion, and I feel confident that even people, by the way, like there are some people who worked under the Hamas government who were simple bureaucrats who are not. This was the only government in town, and they are not ideologically aligned with Hamas. And if given a chance again, I think I feel confident that Gaza could absolutely prosper and do well.

00:35:33:19 - 00:36:04:20

The main problem is Gaza was run by Hamas, which had a set of priorities dedicated to armed resistance and attacking Israel. And so it was placed under a sanctions regime, not just the blockade, but international sanctions. And it made banking really difficult, financial transactions and the transportation of cargo in and out really difficult. So like spare parts for the water treatment stations and Hamas would siphon off like a lot of the fuel for that power plant.

00:36:04:22 - 00:36:43:20

So there was just tiers and tiers of issues that were created by the priorities of the leadership. Not so much that the people who were actually administering Gaza were also not able to. So that makes sense. So it was a leadership and a priorities problem, much more than it being a talent problem. Right. And just to reinforce and it's not just like oh, it's a failed state or a bureaucratic structure.

00:36:43:22 - 00:37:05:16

That is it worked, but it was informed by a terrorist organization. And etc.. Right. And so the priorities and even people's ability to saving different was very limited. Right. So you're saying is, you're actually saying there's a lot of talent. I don't know how, they just need to, if that element is removed and people are allowed to rise to the top and propel a different version or vision forward.

00:37:05:16 - 00:37:28:27

For Gaza, we have the people absolutely. And to also be transparent and to bring in another, less comfortable element into this for some, is that the pushback to that would be to also by people who are in the West Bank who are part of the Palestinian Authority, who say we are we have committed to nonviolence, we do security coordination with Israel.

00:37:29:04 - 00:37:53:29

Yet because of the settlements and because of the policies of the military occupation, we have not been able to prosper in turning also the West Bank into the economic engine that it can and must be to get the Palestinians say more, say more. So there's a lot of talent in the West Bank of public people ask for the Palestinian leaders, the alternatives to Abbas.

00:37:53:29 - 00:38:32:15

And as an end to the current old guard, if you will. And similarly, I say there are a lot of mid-level managers within the Palestinian Authority whom, if given a chance, would absolutely rise and thrive and do well. But they would say that I can't operate freely. Gaza is a different story, but I'm talking about the West Bank and that there is a case where we have the talent, where we have leadership that isn't exactly perfect or immaculate by any stretch, but nevertheless try to focus exclusively on peace, keeping the peace and growing the West Bank into a prosperous territory.

00:38:32:17 - 00:38:59:02

And they were hindered by the settlement expansion and by the military occupation. In other words, that they were hindered both externally and internally. But they would say moreso externally by these Israeli policies that they had effective governance. They were on the path. Okay. So let me just make sure I understand. So their ability to do anything material on the ground is limited by Israeli policy.

00:38:59:05 - 00:39:19:25

So they're just like, we would have done this, we can't because they've been saying precisely that. Now why do I bring that in again, just to reinforce the point that we have a lot of incredibly smart young people and mid-level managers and mid-level bureaucrats and mid-level leaders, if you will, that I couldn't name right now off the top of my head, and neither could you.

00:39:19:27 - 00:39:36:23

But if we give them a chance, if we create the space for them, they will innovate. They are creative people. They want, they're patriots. They want to work, and they're patriots. Not in the sense of I want to eliminate Israel, but I want to serve Palestine. I want to be a part of a nation building.

00:39:37:00 - 00:39:57:01

And that's what excites me and gives me hope, is that the next phase is going to be of nation. Like, this is what I try to tell people about Gaza under the guise of 2.0, reimagining violence and re-envisioning Gaza. And by the way, I believe in a Gaza-first approach to once again do what we should have done as a Palestinian people.

00:39:57:01 - 00:40:27:10

I think in the territories which has turned Gaza into a role model for effective Palestinian self-governance and what the West Bank and occupation-free West Bank would look like. And so it gives me hope that there are a lot of Palestinians who want to build the nation, who want, if they're put to work, if they're guided, if they're given the space and the resources, and certainly if they're not killed by the military operations or occupation or the settlers, then they absolutely would thrive.

00:40:27:10 - 00:40:47:25

And they absolutely would focus on building themselves and becoming part of a prosperous state. And I see that I've seen that before. But I think in Gaza, in the Gaza context in particular, the West Bank is a lot more tricky. I actually think solving Gaza and then not in the medium term is easy. I think the real monster is the West Bank.

00:40:48:01 - 00:41:19:15

Now, going back to the thing about Hamas, I mean, I don't want Hamas to be a part of — Hamas in its current shape and format. I think the open-ended question and the uncomfortable one is the different modalities in which what remains of Hamas is engaged, is transformed into something different, is rehabilitated. Because, remember, Hamas is going to be ultimately part of the big picture of the equation.

00:41:19:22 - 00:41:43:21

And so I push for a pragmatic effort to try to attract the more, you know, the non-criminal, the nonviolent, the ones who are not implicated in a lot of the violent actions to be part of this new process, because we can't just appeal. And to be clear, this is different than saying, this is not me saying Hamas needs to be part of the future per se.

00:41:43:23 - 00:42:15:01

This is me saying that there needs to be something beyond simply outright exclusion. And I don't want Hamas in its current shape to take part of elections, because we've tried that already. If you're not going to renounce violence and acknowledge Israel's existence and Israel's right to exist, and if you're not going to be a part of the regime of agreements that the Palestinian people have signed on to and asked on afterwards, that made us part of the international community, you're of no service to the Palestinian people.

00:42:15:01 - 00:42:43:01

You're just going to bring us back, you're going to bring sanctions, you're going to bring further isolation. So I don't want Hamas to have a seat at the table, especially after October 7th. I'm simply saying that there needs to be some mechanism for engaging what remains of Hamas after October 7th, after the war, to allow some space for transformation and rehabilitation and reform, and to isolate the hardliners and make sure that they can't be

00:42:43:01 - 00:43:16:04

spoilers to the future of Gaza. Yeah, I mean, that sounds, you know, totally normal, reasonable. Another way to say it is to say, look, Hamas represent, it’s a component. It's a component. But even if you — look, I'm trying to be very charitable here. Maybe people will get upset about this, but what I'm trying to say is that whether you like it or not, whether you agree or not, there are elements of what Hamas may have thought out in the beginning as a social movement.

00:43:16:06 - 00:43:36:07

And it has aside into this, there are people who would buy into elements of their approach, not the fundamentals. Right. But for me, for many, for me. And again, I'm saying like at my basic level of understanding. Right? But I presume if there's a religious interpretation, right, a lifestyle that's, you know, and you're not going to that people might hold that.

00:43:36:07 - 00:43:52:00

Right. And this is good for me, and it will stay with me and my family. And I'm not going to try to impose it on other people, forcing the people to behave a certain way. I'm not going to go out and be violent about it, but I want to be, you know, live a life modeled by this approach.

00:43:52:02 - 00:44:15:07

I mean, it sounds reasonable. I don't know enough to say, oh, that's possible. That's likely, is that even, that's just a thing for Hamas? It's totally just a political body that doesn't really report. It's just delegates. It's three things and three things only. And none of it has to actually reflect the way of life. But just, you know, a reader award attack on, and Israel, I don't know, but I believe it.

00:44:15:14 - 00:44:43:28

So what you're saying rings true. So to the extent that's possible. Sure. Precisely. And there are social and religious elements of Hamas, like in principle, I don't have, I don't like political Islam or Islamism, which is what Islamism is. Political Islam, however, then in a democratic context, if they want to have part of the political landscape, if you will, as a group, just like any other, with rights and responsibilities, I think that's entirely reasonable.

00:44:43:28 - 00:45:10:27

As much as I personally don't like the idea and the ideology. Rather, what is a problem is if that political Islam is coupled with a violent program, that again, goes against what the Palestinian people have embraced in the ‘90s and tried to embrace, which is nonviolence, nonviolent resistance, political negotiations to try to achieve results. And that's what Hamas spoiled parallel with the Israeli right

00:45:10:27 - 00:45:38:14

and Netanyahu in the ‘90s. Who was it who were inciting against the attack? Rabin on one side and inciting against high sacrifice for all of Yasser Arafat's fault. He withstood tremendous pressure from Hamas and Islamists and people backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, who wanted to spoil the peace process. And that's what Hamas did. And in a way, they served as the useful idiot that enabled anti-Palestinian forces within Israel to say, we don't have a partner.

00:45:38:19 - 00:46:07:16

And so I still believe that, you know, this goes back to that, like the piece about Gaza. I think there's a good chunk of Hamas right now probably don't want to be going back to being a government anyway. I think Hamas wants to just ensure that its political survival is secure. But I doubt that Hamas at this point has any interest in being a government in Gaza, because they know that the minute the war stops, there will be a reckoning.

00:46:07:20 - 00:46:29:01

The people of Gaza have been focused on survival right now. Why do you think Sinwar hasn't put out a single video message? Since the beginning of October 7th? I've asked a multitude of Gazans of housing because, again, what they tell me is Gazans will eat him alive. But he is so deeply hated right now, so deeply unpopular because he made this decision.

00:46:29:01 - 00:46:47:13

He, it was a military coup, even against the political groups, by the way. I just meant I was traveling in Europe, and I met with a Palestinian journalist in the West Bank who specializes in Hamas, and he meets with every. He met with Haniyeh right before he was assassinated. And what I asked him, like, why do you think they did this?

00:46:47:13 - 00:47:10:22

And her decision that was like the stupidest thing from so many different levels. He said, no, this actually is a demonstration of the fissures within Hamas, many of whom are against prolonging the war, against what October 7th has done to them and to the Palestinian people. And they said this was their way of saying to Sinwar, you broke it, you own it, you started this, and now this is on you.

00:47:10:22 - 00:47:32:10

We're making you a leader, not because they believe, they know his days are numbered, but not because they necessarily believe that Sinwar is the most brilliant man in Hamas, but because they're throwing it back at him and saying, you screwed this up, and so it's on you to fix it. Yeah. It's interesting. I mean, even in Israel, like a lot of the media was saying that he was like, no, he was not interested in the position.

00:47:32:13 - 00:48:08:21

And related to that, you know, I, there's something that you said, he said earlier that I, look, I don't know how to approach it, and we don't have time to go to the phones like we did. Come back in conversation. I'm curious about this because the way you describe it and from my lived experience, you know, certainly, but I'd say moreso, is I do think as far as I know and remember, there were moments in the ‘90s where, you know, hope was on the horizon.

00:48:08:23 - 00:48:34:27

You know, I was younger than I remember it, but I still remember the feeling that certainly very much lived through the lamentation of many parts of Israeli society despite, which wasn't my kind of, yeah, you know, educational surrounding that was different. But, you know, I lived in a, I ended up being in a high school in a more right-wing conservative kind of situation within a larger settlement,

00:48:34:29 - 00:48:55:02

you know, I lived through the second Intifada. I'm the first to be father, but I have to say that I don't recall that ethos of, like, we were on the brink of peace and prosperity. I know what broke it, and I know, and I'm unfamiliar on that stuff, but the part that I struggle with in the last year is that I don't I, you know, and this is, you know, back to the beginning.

00:48:55:02 - 00:49:10:10

It's like why I'm so happy quote unquote. We're not happy that, you know, but as long as we can verify this is true and correct. But that's possible. Even if it's not true, it's still awful. I want to think like the polls were wrong and most of us in Gaza were not happy with October 7th.

00:49:10:10 - 00:49:46:20

They're against the government. And that gives us an opportunity to kind of shape things differently, like the ethos, the narrative, like the conflict is so long, so, so long. Right? It didn't start in the ‘90s. It didn't start in the ‘80s. Not in the ‘70s. Right. And there were issues for a very long time and like, the point is to, like the accounting of like who did what and what was the fault and why is this and that, but it’s to say that I feel like there's been an arc of, at the very least with, you know, with the

00:49:46:20 - 00:50:10:06

Arab world, in the Muslim world, coming to terms with Israel. Right. That's like the most modest version of the evolution to a full-on acceptance of like this. This is like a positive. And so my question was like, how  do we get more of that. Right. Because you talked about the, you know, the necessary security pieces.

00:50:10:06 - 00:50:44:16

You talked about allowing, you know there's parts that Israel needs to do, which means, you know, stop the expansion of settlements, kind of build that in. And likely we'll have to at some point clear out some of them and figure out all that messiness. But there's something about like the story that we tell ourselves and how do we kind of graduate to this place of saying, can you imagine what the Middle East and the Mediterranean coastline would look like if we can take a train from, you know, all the way up in Lebanon and north of that, all the way down and, you know, and get to

00:50:44:16 - 00:50:57:16

Egypt, you know, just like travel between the different countries in these different cultures and kind of like, that's like the utopian type of, you know, version of this. And I wonder, like, how do we propagate that story, how do we get that out there so that we are not just like, oh, I'm insecure, these are poor.

00:50:57:16 - 00:51:17:09

But it's not just about that, but it's a much more expansive, inclusive, hopeful story. It all starts with Gaza, in my opinion. God. That's why I feel strongly about a Gaza-first approach, because it overlooks that Mediterranean as a gas field. It can have an airport and I try to build an airport in Gaza. It had an airport that I flew into in ‘99.

00:51:17:09 - 00:51:44:26

In 2000, it can have a seaport and should have a seaport. I mean, this is part of why I pushed for the airdrops is to show that, the food airdrops is to show that no security issue is insurmountable. If we do coordinate with Israel. Gaza's airspace went from being off-limits for basically 23 years, except for Israeli military aviation, to having dozens of countries flying their air forces and their cargo airplanes over.

00:51:44:27 - 00:52:14:27

And to me, that was just a symbolic opening of Gaza's airspace in a way that gave me hope that this can work in the future. And so I've long aspired to have some kind of a connection between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel through, in Gaza, through a rail line, through the airport and through the seaport. And imagine a rail line that passes from Gaza through the Negev desert all the way to Saudi Arabia

00:52:15:00 - 00:52:35:27

and it connects also to Jordan. We can have that corridor between Gaza and the West Bank if we get Gaza right, and Gaza small in space, you only have 2.3 million people. There's a lot to be done like, but if we get Gaza right, I genuinely think it can be the role model for solving the West Bank.

00:52:35:29 - 00:53:00:16

It can be the stabilizing anchor, if you will, for beginning to isolate the Islamic Republic and beginning to undo that resistance narrative. Because here's the thing we need to do in order to effectively dismantle the resistance narrative, we have to empower the moderates. We have to show that peace pays off, not just in terms of economic opportunities, but in terms of freedom, liberation, and coexistence.

00:53:00:21 - 00:53:35:00

And this is where I believe that we as Palestinians, to gain our freedom, we need Israelis. We cannot impose a solution upon the Israelis. And some will be like, well, what do you mean? We need to be nice to the occupiers and occupation — my saying is like, no, we shift the narrative. We shift the conversation into one of positivity, peace as a courageous, positive evolution that is positive and impactful and empowering to the Palestinian people to give them the space and the freedom and the sovereignty and independence they need to build themselves up.

00:53:35:03 - 00:54:00:11

And so I stand by that belief that solving Gaza is like regional stability goes through, passes through Gaza. It starts with Gaza. And that's why. And it's funny, it's been funny. I've been socializing this term ‘Gaza first’ and people misunderstand it and they wonder if this is like the MAGA of Gaza, of Palestine, if you will.

00:54:00:13 - 00:54:19:27

but my thing is, again, to prove, because there will also be those on the Israeli side, just as there are on the Palestinian side. But there will be some on the Israeli side who are basically, they don't believe there can ever be peace with the Palestinians or to them at best. Let us basically keep their mouth shut and don't do anything.

00:54:19:27 - 00:54:40:14

And so I want to prove those people right. And if we have to stand before an international forum to say, look at Gaza and how we have turned the ship around, and this is what an occupation-free West Bank would look like. That to me is inspirational. That to me is the building block for a new future. A Palestine to point out the connectivity.

00:54:40:18 - 00:55:12:02

And you know what? It might not include Lebanon starting it initially, it might not include Syria, but I absolutely believe in, you know, a coastline railroad, if you will, like. When I was in Gaza, man, that like infrastructure weirdly inspired me because I had flown into Gaza airport here was destroyed in 2000 to complete in 2001, Israel bombed a few facilities and then in 2002, just took out the runway.

00:55:12:04 - 00:55:31:16

But that airport inspired me and the possibility of it and the seaport. But they rebuilt it afterwards. Wasn't it destroyed in ‘06 afterwards by Hamas took over? Well, it was never really rebuilt. When it was destroyed it was basically recycled a lot of the building materials like because of the blockade and the restrictions.

00:55:31:19 - 00:55:50:18

Hamas and other scrappers and criminals, if you will, just went, tore through the facilities and took all the rebar, took all the cement blocks and took all the rebar that was on the runway, but only off track because there was something inspired. No, no, no. Exactly, exactly. But that's what I'm saying. Like what you just said.

00:55:50:18 - 00:56:14:09

What you said about like, envisioning, inspiring hope, I genuinely think passes through Gaza. And so it's difficult for people because the pain is so immense right now and the horrors and I struggle with this myself, with my family, my brother and what remains of my aunts and my uncles and the death of my friends. And just a couple of days ago, one of my really good friends is a super opponent to Hamas

00:56:14:09 - 00:56:42:04

and the war in Gaza and his brother and sister were just killed by an Israeli. So it's killing Hamas opponents and Hamas proponents alike. So that's why I'm saying in the short term, I understand folks, particularly in the territories, and in Palestine, are struggling to think of what the future looks like. That's why it's incumbent upon us with privilege, with the safety and that relative separation from it at a visceral level.

00:56:42:08 - 00:57:10:07

I'm not separated, it’s my whole life right now. But to come up with these visions, being pragmatic, being based on empathy and humanity and also being realistic in the need to transform and the need for change to come from within first, before we can ask the Israelis for it, and then finally to get rid of these maximalist, utopian, you know, slogans and visions and ‘from the river to the sea.’

00:57:10:07 - 00:57:31:25

And like, there are some people that know with armed resistance, it's not going to work. But to them they're like, I was talking to this guy the other day, and he was like, we will be occupied for 100 years before we give up. And I was like, oh, how stupid, like, how ridiculous. Like, my goodness, why? You're going to destroy the Palestinian people with these narratives.

00:57:32:01 - 00:57:55:18

But unfortunately, these narratives now have a lot of legs to walk on in the Western world and in the so-called pro-Palestine movement, which, again, I'm not out to delegitimize the pro-Palestine movement. I'm just frustrated that large parts of the movement have been taken over by unhelpful voices, by pragmatic voices, by ideological and maximalist and reductionist voices.

00:57:55:25 - 00:58:24:16

The enemy of the good is perfect. There's not going to be a perfect solution to this, but let's solve Gaza. We stop the killing. We initiate political transformation. We allow Gaza to develop into its full potential. And I'm not necessarily talking about a neoliberal, single Singapore economic model. I want it to work for all of Gaza, because I don't want just one class of people to rise and become the oligarchs and everybody else to remain dependent refugees.

00:58:24:18 - 00:58:58:16

I want truly empowering transformation in capitalism and prosperity. And I see it, I feel it, I visualize it, and I see how in five years, if we have the building blocks of that within ten years, there can absolutely be a viable, vibrant Palestinian state. We can prove to Israelis and to the whole world that doesn't want to invest a single more penny into Gaza, only to be destroyed again, that the next battle is not won with rockets and tunnels.

00:58:58:22 - 00:59:17:10

The next battle is one of nation building and of state building and focusing on us, investing in us as Palestinian people. So that was beautiful. So the one thing I would add, sure, that I'm sure personally. But before proving to Israel, before proving to the world, to prove to yourself that the Palestinian people are responsible. Certainly.

00:59:17:14 - 00:59:38:06

So, I mean, without a doubt, I mean, that is the target audience, that is. But I genuinely think though, like the reason why I didn't include it, is it goes without saying that in order like anything that I'm thinking about, I mean, there are a lot of Palestinians that are well-off, that are in the diaspora that could act like, but sorry, we're going to cut this out.

00:59:38:06 - 00:59:59:20

I'm going to reframe the point that I was trying to make is that, of course, this whole has to work for the Palestinian people, but in order for it to work for the Palestinian people, in order to get the kind of action and steps and strategies and visions that work for the Palestinian people, we need buy-in from the, you know, the allies in the region, the Arabs and the Muslims.

00:59:59:27 - 01:00:30:09

We need these rallies on board. We need Israel to open Gaza up and to allow that. And I know that's difficult for so many people, with October 7th being so fresh in people's minds. I think, you know, we need to open Gaza. But that is exactly the antidote to further radicalization and to further, you know, the more Gaza's isolated, the worse off Israel will be strategically in the long term. If Gaza's opened up and I mean fully open up for trade and commerce, and we can address security issues,

01:00:30:16 - 01:01:20:10

but if it's opened up for trade and commerce and travel and development and we allow tourism, we allow diaspora Palestinians to visit Gaza, to have a sense of identity and connection and to meet actual Palestinians instead of being in Western college campuses projecting their vision of what their people want, that can actually create just so many intangible benefits that work towards that linear progression, towards a side, a Palestinian state with sovereignty and independence, living side by side with Israel, that there being separation after this much conflict, but Israel also being an integral part of the Palestinian success story and in so doing being well-integrated within the region, within Egypt

01:01:20:10 - 01:01:40:03

and the Gulf states and Jordan and beyond. And I see that, like I said,  not one bit of this is pragmatism. I think there are enough after what the people of Gaza have suffered. They absolutely want to see something different. And this is why I'm throwing my hat in the ring. This is why I'm walking away from a comfortable, quiet life.

01:01:40:05 - 01:02:00:04

Because I see the opportunity amidst the horror and the misery. I think this is a perfect place to end. Unfortunately, and love our conversations, but that was, you know, truly inspiring. And I, you know, there's so much more to cover and so many more questions you can have. I hope you, we will have more of these conversations formally and informally.

01:02:00:07 - 01:02:25:26

But really, thank you again for joining us for this installment of our, you know, our three-part conversation. And, you know, there's so much more. I'll see. There's also an introduction, what people should be, you know, watching closely, and supporting you in your work because you’re — the success of what you will do early and impact and, you know, many people in the region hopefully and, you know, we do covered.

01:02:25:26 - 01:02:43:29

But, lots of luck in your career move to D.C. Thank you. You know, I’m nervous, but I'm actually excited. Like, I think the new phase is going to be, like, serious, serious business. and it will give me an opportunity to elevate my voice because I don't want to just be an activist forever. I don't want to be a writer forever.

01:02:43:29 - 01:03:04:25

I don't want to be a Facebook or Twitter guy forever. I want results,, I want things because I've, like I said, I see the writing on the wall. I see the possibilities and the opportunities, even as I struggle in the short term with how hopeless it is and how it's hard to see.

01:03:04:25 - 01:03:23:15

With Sinwar and Netanyahu being in power, it's really hard to see how we move forward. But we’ve got to think beyond that. We cannot be so caught up in the immediate and in the short term that we failed to visualize something that gives hope to the Palestinians and to the Israelis. Both people, believe it or not, are desperately in need of hope.

01:03:23:20 - 01:03:45:07

It doesn't mean it's a symmetric desire for hope. I know the Israelis want to move on with their lives and want to live quiet lives. They don't want to deal with security issues. They don't want to. But the Palestinians also want to move on with their lives in terms of being given an opportunity to build themselves up and to not be dependent and to be free of violence and intimidation and being in subjugation.

01:03:45:09 - 01:04:11:09

And so I see both people's desperate pleas for hope, regardless of the asymmetry of the power dynamics, as something that we have to feed, we have to inspire. And again, not just with Kumbaya, but with pragmatic, realistic visions rather than with destructive, harmful, hateful, vitriolic narratives. And well said. So thank you again. Thank you, sir. Thank you for having me.

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Young Zionist Voices Book Launch: Reclaiming Identity & Leadership Post-October 7

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No, We Shouldn’t Retire the Word ‘Zionism.’ We Should Take it Back.